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Tables and figuresAbstract
This paper presents a new argument for international monetary policy coordination based
on considerations of structural asymmetries across countries. In a two-country world with a
traded and a non-traded sector in each country, optimal independent monetary policy cannot
replicate the natural-rate allocations. There are potential welfare gains from coordination since
the planner under a cooperating regime internalizes a terms-of-trade externality that independent
central banks tend to overlook. Yet, with symmetric structures across countries, the gains are
quantitatively small. If the size of the traded sector di®ers across countries, the gains can be sizable
and increase with the degree of asymmetry. The planner's optimal policy not only internalizes the
terms-of-trade externality, it also creates a terms-of-trade bias in favor the country with a larger
traded sector. Further, the planner tries to balance the terms-of-trade bias against the need to
stabilize °uctuations in the terms-of-trade gap.
JEL classi¯cation: E52, F41, F42
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August 2005Non-Technical Summary
In an increasingly integrated world economy, should countries coordinate monetary policy or
should they conduct monetary policy independently? Recent theoretical work within the new
open-economy macro (NOEM) framework has reached a surprising conclusion: inward-looking
policy is approximately optimal and there is not much to gain from policy coordination.
This paper provides a new argument for international monetary policy coordination based on
considerations of structural asymmetries across countries. Our analysis is based on a framework
that generalizes the standard two-country, one-sector model in the NOEM literature by consid-
ering multiple sectors of production in each country. In particular, we consider a traded sector,
the products of which enter the consumption baskets in the households in both countries; and
a non-traded sector, the products of which enter domestic baskets only. An innovation of this
paper is that we allow the size of the traded sector to di®er across countries to capture some of
the structural asymmetries between countries at di®erent stages of development. This feature is
motivated by the observation that a more developed country has typically a larger service sector
than does a less developed one, and the traded component in services is typically small.
In our welfare analysis, we obtain welfare measures through second-order approximations to
the households' utility functions and to the private sector's optimizing conditions. We show
that, with multiple sectors and thus multiple sources of nominal rigidities, optimal independent
monetary policy cannot replicate the natural-rate allocations, creating a scope for coordination.
The gains from coordination arise from two channels. The ¯rst channel is rather standard in
the NOEM literature and is independent of the structural asymmetry in the model: if acting
independently, a country's central bank tends to overlook the e®ect of terms-of-trade on the
other country's well-being; whereas when the countries cooperate, this terms-of-trade externality
would be properly recognized and e®orts would be made to internalize it. The second channel
is unique to our model and works only through structural asymmetries across countries: the
planner's optimal policy under the cooperating regime creates a terms-of-trade bias that favors
the country with a larger traded sector; and this bias has to be balanced against the need to
stabilize °uctuations in the terms-of-trade gap, among other variables in the policy objective.
Absent structural asymmetry, the welfare gains from coordination are quantitatively small under
calibrated parameters. As the degree of asymmetry enlarges, so do the welfare gains in general.
With plausible structural asymmetries, there are sizable gains. Thus, a stronger case for policy
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As countries become more interdependent through international trade, should they conduct mon-
etary policies independently or should they coordinate their policies? In other words, are there
gains from international monetary policy coordination? This question lies at the heart of the intel-
lectual discussions about optimal monetary policy in open economies. The literature has produced
a strong conclusion in favor of inward-looking policies and °exible exchange-rate regimes. This
conclusion has been drawn not only in the traditional literature within the Mundell-Fleming frame-
work that features ad hoc stabilizing policy goals, but also in the more recent New Open-Economy
Macro (NOEM) literature that features optimizing individuals, monopolistic competition and
nominal rigidities, with the representative household's utility function serving as a natural wel-
fare metric for optimal policy. In the traditional literature, many have argued that the gains from
coordination are likely to be small because a °exible exchange-rate system would e®ectively in-
sulate impacts of foreign disturbances on domestic employment and output [e.g., Mundell (1961)
and the survey by McKibbin (1997)]. In the NOEM literature pioneered by Obstfeld and Rogo®
(1995), it has been shown that, although gains from coordination are theoretically possible, they
are quantitatively small [e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000a, 2002), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005)].
The remarkably strong conclusion about the lack of gains from coordination has stimulated
a lively debate and a growing strand of literature in search of sources of coordination gains by
enriching the simple framework built by Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000a, 2002). Several potential
sources have been identi¯ed. For instance, the gains from coordination can be related to the de-
gree of exchange-rate pass-through [e.g., Devereux and Engel (2003), Duarte (2003), and Corsetti
and Pesenti (2005)].1 Even with perfect exchange-rate pass-through, inward-looking monetary
policy can be suboptimal and be improved upon by coordination, depending on the values of
the intertemporal elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in di®erent
countries [e.g., Clarida, et al. (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Pappa (2004), Sutherland
(2002a), and Tsacharov (2004)]. Policy coordination may also produce welfare gains if the inter-
national ¯nancial markets are incomplete [e.g., Benigno (2001) and Sutherland (2002b)], policy
makers have imperfect information [e.g., Dellas (2004)], or domestic shocks are imperfectly cor-
related across sectors [e.g., Canzoneri, et al. (2004)].
The present paper emphasizes the role of asymmetries in the production structure across
countries in generating gains from policy coordination. To this end we build a two-country model
in the spirit of the NOEM literature, with two production sectors within each county. One
1Corsetti and Dedola (2002) show that, if the distribution of traded goods requires local inputs, then international
markets would be endogenously segmented, rendering exchange-rate pass-through incomplete. This feature also
provides a scope for international monetary policy cooperation.
6
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 514
August 2005sector produces traded goods that enter the consumption baskets in both countries, and the
other sector produces non-traded goods that enter the domestic consumption basket only. To
allow for real e®ects of monetary policy, we assume staggered price setting in both sectors.2 A
key point of departure from the NOEM literature is that we allow the share of traded goods in
the consumption basket to be di®erent across countries to capture an important cross-country
di®erence in production and trading structures. As Figure 1 shows, a developed country has
typically a much larger share of service value-added in GDP than does a developing country, and
the traded component of services is small. In this sense, the asymmetric production and trading
structure in our model can be interpreted broadly as characterizing countries at di®erent stages
of development. In the context of this model, we examine how the presence of multiple sectors
and sectoral asymmetries across countries would a®ect macroeconomic stability and welfare under
independent or cooperating central banks.
To help exposition, we assume log-utility in aggregate consumption, a unitary elasticity of
substitution between domestically-produced traded goods and imported goods, and a unitary
elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods in the consumption baskets. In
the absence of non-traded sectors, many authors have demonstrated that, under a comparable
set of assumptions (i.e., log-utility and unitary elasticity of substitution for goods produced in
di®erent countries), optimal monetary policy for an independent central bank is inward-looking
and there are no gains from coordination.3 Introducing a non-traded sector and sticky prices
in both sectors renders exchange-rate pass-through incomplete even under producer-currency
pricing; meanwhile, it creates a policy trade-o® facing independent central banks when sectoral
shocks are imperfectly correlated, which gives rise to a scope for gains from policy coordination.
Our simplifying assumptions also make it possible to derive second-order approximations to the
households' utility functions even in the presence of multiple sources of nominal rigidities and
sectoral asymmetry, and help us to obtain an analytical expression for the welfare criterion that
can be used to compare outcomes of di®erent policies. Despite their apparent restrictiveness,
these assumptions do not prevent the model from generating signi¯cant coordination gains, nor
2The NOEM literature on optimal monetary policy typically employs a simpler model with one-period prede-
termined prices, an advantage of which is its analytical tractability [e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 2000a, 2002),
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Canzoneri, et al. (2004)]. However, assuming staggered price-setting as we do here
instead of predetermined prices helps generate richer and arguably more realistic equilibrium dynamics [e.g., Clar-
ida, et al. (2002), Kollmann (2002)] and is thus more appropriate for quantitative welfare analysis. In addition, as
is well known in the closed-economy literature, staggered price-setting leads to ine±cient price dispersion, giving
rise to an additional source of ine±ciency that optimal monetary policy needs to deal with.
3See, for example, Clarida et al. (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003), and Pappa (2004), among others.
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model.
The literature has long emphasized the importance of the non-traded sector in understanding
international business cycle °uctuations [e.g., Stockman and Tesar (1995), Baxter,et al (1998),
Corsetti, et al. (2003), and Ghironi and Melitz (2003)] and real exchange rate movements [e.g.,
Rogo® (1996) and Burnstein et al (2003)]. Empirical studies suggest that, at least for the OECD
countries, a substantial part of aggregate °uctuations originates from sectoral shocks rather than
national disturbances [e.g., Stockman (1988), and Marimon and Zilibotti (1998)]; and within
each country, the time series processes generating productivity shocks in traded and non-traded
sectors are quite di®erent [e.g., Canzoneri, et al. (1999)]. These studies cast doubts on the ability
of models with a single traded sector in explaining the transmission of shocks across countries.
Yet, it is remarkable that studies of optimal monetary policy in open economies typically abstract
from the non-traded sector or other multi-sector features of the actual economy by assuming that
each country is completely specialized in a single traded sector, with no distinctions between
sector-speci¯c and country-speci¯c shocks.4
Our paper contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, we study optimal monetary
policy in an open-economy model that explicitly incorporates a non-traded sector, so that a
monetary authority needs to confront a policy trade-o® stemming from multiple sources of nominal
rigidities and imperfectly correlated sector-speci¯c shocks; whereas in the standard one-sector
model with traded goods only, policy makers are not concerned about such trade-o®s. Second,
we make a methodological contribution to the literature by deriving an explicit expression for
welfare under both independent central banks and a common planner. To our knowledge, we are
the ¯rst to derive such a welfare criterion in an open economy with multiple sectors based on
quadratic approximations of households' utility function.5 Finally, the main value-added of the
current paper in relation to the existing literature is that, by introducing non-traded goods and
asymmetric production structures, without any further modi¯cations, we are able to go beyond
4A few notable exceptions include Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002) and Hau (2000), whose models feature a traded and
a non-traded sector, with perfectly correlated shocks; Canzoneri, et al. (2004), who examine a version of the model
presented in Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002), but allow imperfect correlations between sectoral shocks; Tille (2002),
who presents a two-country model that features incomplete specialization of the countries in two types of traded
goods (but with no non-traded goods), so that a distinction between sectoral shocks and national shocks arises; and
Huang and Liu (2004a), who study a model with multiple stages of production and trade in intermediate goods.
Unlike our work here, all of these studies maintain symmetric production and trading structures across countries.
5For a comprehensive description of the general approach to deriving the welfare criterion for optimal policy
based on quadratic approximations to households' utility functions, see Michael Woodford (2003).
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of international monetary policy cooperation.
Our results can be easily summarized. With multiple sectors and thus multiple sources of nom-
inal rigidities, optimal independent monetary policy cannot replicate the natural-rate allocations,
creating a scope for coordination. Such gains materialize as the planner under the cooperating
regime tries to internalize a terms-of-trade externality that independent central banks tend to
overlook. Yet, in the absence of structural asymmetry, the gains obtained through this channel
are quantitatively small under calibrated parameters. With asymmetric structures, we show that
the planner's optimal policy creates a terms-of-trade bias in favor of the country that has a larger
traded sector. This terms-of-trade bias needs to be balanced against the planner's desire to stabi-
lize °uctuations in the terms-of-trade gap, among other variables in the policy objective derived
from the ¯rst principle. The gains from coordination increase with the degree of structural asym-
metry and can be sizable under calibrated parameters. Further, the gains increase with the share
of imported goods in the traded consumption baskets and with the durations of pricing contracts;
but decrease with the correlations of domestic shocks. To the extent that the production and
trading structure in our model captures a di®erence between developing countries and developed
ones, our results shed some light on the welfare consequences of international monetary policy
coordination between countries at di®erent stages of development.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
examines equilibrium dynamics. Section 4 discusses optimal monetary policy under independent
central banks and under cooperation. Section 5 assesses the quantitative gains from policy coor-
dination and studies their sensitivity to changes in a few key parameters in the model. Finally,
Section 6 concludes. We focus on presenting the main results and intuitions in the text, and
relegate detailed derivations to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a world economy with two countries, home and foreign, each populated by a continuum
of identical, in¯nitely-lived households. The representative household in each country is endowed
with one unit of time, and derives utility from consuming a basket of ¯nal goods. The consumption
basket consists of traded goods, either domestically produced or imported (e.g., manufacturing
goods), and of non-traded goods (e.g., services). Final consumption goods are composites of
di®erentiated intermediate goods produced in two sectors, a traded good sector, and a non-traded
good sector. Production of intermediate goods requires domestic labor as the only input, which
is supplied by domestic households. Labor is mobile across sectors, but not across countries. The
9
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traded goods in the ¯nal consumption basket may di®er.
Time is discrete. In each period of time t = 0;1;:::, a productivity shock is realized in each
intermediate-good sector. Firms and households make their optimizing decisions after observing
the shocks. All agents have access to an international ¯nancial market, where they can trade a
state-contingent nominal bond. The government in each country conducts monetary policy and
uses lump-sum transfers to ¯nance production subsidies.
2.1 Representative Households
The preferences of households are symmetric across countries, so we focus on the representative




¯t[lnCt ¡ ªLt]; (2.1)
where 0 < ¯ < 1 is a subjective discount factor, Ct > 0 denotes consumption, Lt 2 (0;1) denotes
hours worked, and E is an expectation operator.
The purchase of consumption goods is ¯nanced by labor income, pro¯t income, and a lump-
sum transfer from the government. In addition, the household has access to an international
¯nancial market, where state-contingent nominal bonds (denominated in home currency) can be
traded. The period-budget constraint facing the household is given by
PtCt + EtDt;t+1Bt+1 · WtLt + Bt + ¦t + Tt; t = 0;1;:::; (2.2)
where Pt is the price level, Bt+1 is the holdings of the state-contingent nominal bond that pays
one unit of home currency in period t + 1 if a speci¯ed state is realized, Dt;t+1 is the period-t
price of such bonds, Wt is the nominal wage rate, ¦t is the pro¯t income, and Tt is the lump-sum
transfer from the government.
The household maximizes (2.1) subject to (2.2). The optimal labor supply decision implies
ªCt = Wt=Pt; (2.3)
which states that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equals the







so that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution equals the price of the state contingent
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The ¯nal consumption basket consists of traded goods (domestically produced and imported)
and non-traded goods. Denote CNt the composite good that is non-traded, and CTt the composite
of goods that are traded. Then we have
Ct = ¹ ®C®
TtC1¡®
Nt ; ¹ ® = ®¡®(1 ¡ ®)®¡1: (2.6)
The traded component CTt is itself an aggregate of domestically produced good CHt and imported
good CFt, that is,
CTt = ¹ !C!
HtC1¡!
Ft ; ¹ ! = !¡!(1 ¡ !)!¡1: (2.7)
Solving the household's expenditure-minimizing problem yields the following demand functions
for non-traded and traded goods:
CNt = (1 ¡ ®)PtCt= ¹ PNt; CTt = ®PtCt= ¹ PTt; (2.8)
where ¹ PNt is the price of ¯nal non-traded goods, and ¹ PTt is the price of ¯nal traded goods, which
are related to the price level Pt by
Pt = ¹ P®
Tt ¹ P1¡®
Nt : (2.9)
The induced demand functions for domestically produced traded goods and for imported goods
are respectively given by
CHt = ! ¹ PTtCTt= ¹ PHt; CFt = (1 ¡ !) ¹ PTtCTt=[Et ¹ P¤
Ft]; (2.10)
where ¹ PHt is the price index of home-produced traded goods, ¹ P¤
Ft is the price index of foreign-
produced traded goods, and Et is the nominal exchange rate. These prices are related to ¹ PTt
by
¹ PTt = ¹ P!
Ht[Et ¹ P¤
Ft]1¡! (2.11)
Throughout our analysis, we assume that ¯rms set prices in the sellers' local currency and the
law-of-one-price holds, so that the cost of imported goods in the home consumption basket is
simply the price of traded goods charged by foreign exporting ¯rms, adjusted by the nominal
exchange rate, as in (2.11).6
6Several recent studies discuss the e®ects of buyers' local currency pricing [e.g., Devereux and Engel (2003)],
\dollar pricing" [e.g., Devereux, et al. (2003)], or some intermediate pricing behavior [e.g., Corsetti and Pesenti
(2005)] on the international dimension of monetary policy. We focus here on sellers' local currency pricing, although
it should not be too di±cult to extend our analysis to a model with di®erent pricing behaviors. The case of \dollar
pricing" (or Euro pricing) can be particularly relevant in studying the gains from coordination between a more
advanced economy and a less developed one, since there is evidence that the currency of the developed economy
is typically used as the \vehicle currency" [see, for example, Goldberg and Tille (2005) and ECB (2005)]. In our
view, this issue is of interest in itself and is important enough to deserve investigation in a separate paper.
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There are two sectors producing intermediate goods: a non-traded sector and a traded sector.
In each sector, there is a continuum of ¯rms producing di®erentiated products indexed in the
interval [0;1]. To produce intermediate goods in each sector requires labor input, with constant-
returns-to-scale (CRS) technologies
YNt(i) = ANtLNt(i); i 2 [0;1]; (2.12)
and
YHt(j) + Y ¤
Ht(j) = ATtLTt(j); j 2 [0;1]; (2.13)
where YNt(i) is the output of type-i non-traded intermediate goods; YHt(j) is the output of type-j
traded intermediate goods sold in the domestic market, and Y ¤
Ht(j) that exported to the foreign
market; ANt and ATt are productivity shocks in the two sectors; and LN and LT are labor inputs
in the non-traded and in the traded sector respectively. The logarithms of the productivity shocks
in each sector follows a random-walk process, that is,
ln(Ak;t+1) = ln(Ak;t) + "k;t+1; k 2 fN;Tg; (2.14)
where "Nt and "Tt are mean-zero, iid normal processes with ¯nite variances given by ¾2
N and ¾2
T,
respectively. We allow the shocks to be correlated across sectors, with a correlation coe±cient
given by ½TN (they need not be perfectly correlated). The productivity shocks in the foreign
country follow similar processes, and potentially correlated with the shocks in the home country,
with correlation coe±cients denoted by ½TT for traded sectors and ½NN for non-traded sectors.
There is a CES aggregation technology that transforms intermediate goods produced in each


















where µN and µT denote elasticities of substitution between di®erentiated products in the two
sectors. To ensure equilibrium existence, we assume that the µ's both exceed unity (see, for
example, Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)).
By solving the cost-minimizing problem of the aggregation sector, we obtain the demand














where PNt(i) is the price of type-i non-traded intermediate goods, PHt(j) is the price of type-j









are the corresponding price indices.
12
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 514
August 2005Firms are price takers in the input market and monopolistic competitors in the product mar-
kets. In each sector, ¯rms stagger their pricing decisions in the spirit of Calvo (1983). Speci¯cally,
in each period of time, each ¯rm receives an i.i.d. random signal that determines whether or not it
can set a new price. The probability that a ¯rm can adjust its price is 1¡°k in sector k 2 fN;Tg.
By the law of large numbers, a fraction 1 ¡°k of all ¯rms in sector k can adjust prices, while the
rest of the ¯rms cannot.
If a ¯rm who produces type-i non-traded goods can set a new price, it chooses PNt(i) to





N Dt;¿[PNt(i)(1 + ¿N) ¡ VN¿]Y d
N¿(i); (2.17)
where ¿N is a production subsidy, VNt is the unit cost, which is identical across ¯rms since
all ¯rms face the same input market, and Y d
Nt(i) is the demand schedule for type i non-traded
good described in (2.16). Regardless of whether a ¯rm can adjust its price, it has to solve a
cost-minimizing problem, the solution of which yields the unit cost function
VNt = Wt=ANt; (2.18)























where ¹N = µN=(µN ¡ 1) measures the steady-state markup in sector N. Similarly, the optimal














H¿(j) + Y ¤d
H¿(j)]
; (2.21)
where ¹T = µT=(µT ¡ 1) measures the steady state markup in sector T. From solving the ¯rm's
cost-minimizing problem, we obtain the unit cost function
VTt = Wt=ATt; (2.22)
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in the consumption basket may di®er from that in the home country. In particular, the foreign
consumption basket is given by
C¤
t = ¹ ®¤C¤®¤
Tt C¤1¡®¤
Nt ; ¹ ®¤ = ®¤¡®(1 ¡ ®¤)®¤¡1; (2.24)
where ®¤ may not equal to ®. The foreign country's structure is otherwise symmetric to that of
the home country's. In what follows, we denote all foreign variables with an asterisk and assume
that all other parameters are identical to their counterparts in the home country.
2.3 Risk Sharing, Market Clearing, and Equilibrium
Since the state-contingent nominal bond is traded in the international ¯nancial market, the foreign













By combining this equation with its home counterpart (2.4) and iterating with respect to t, we






where Qt = EtP¤
t =Pt is the real exchange rate, and Á0 = Q0C¤
0=C0. The risk-sharing condition
links the real exchange rate to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in the two
countries, so that all households face identical relative price of consumption goods in the world
market.
In equilibrium, each country's labor market as well as the world bond market clear. Since
labor is mobile within each country (but not across countries), labor market clearing implies that




Also, in equilibrium, nominal bonds are in zero net supply in the world market, so that Bt+B¤
t = 0:
Our goal is to analyze optimal monetary policy under two alternative monetary regimes. One
in which each country tries to maximize its own households' welfare, taking the other country's
policy actions as given; and the other in which a world planner tries to coordinate the two
countries' monetary policy so as to maximize their collective welfare. For this purpose, we do not
specify a particular monetary policy rule. Instead, we solve for the optimal policy that maximizes
the welfare objective under each regime, subject to the private sector's optimizing conditions. For
any given monetary policy, we can de¯ne an equilibrium for this world economy.






t+1 for the foreign household; allocations YNt(i), and LNt(i), and price PNt(i) for
14
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Nt(i) for non-traded intermediate good producer i 2 [0;1] in the foreign country; allocations
YHt(j), Y ¤
Ht(j), and LTt(j), and price PHt(j) for traded intermediate good producer j 2 [0;1] in
the home country and Y ¤
Ft(j), YFt(j), and L¤
Tt(j), and price P¤
Ft(j) for traded intermediate good





Ft, and wages Wt and W¤
t , that satisfy the following conditions: (i) taking the prices
and the wage as given, the household's allocations in each country solve its utility maximizing
problem; (ii) taking the wage and all prices but its own as given, the allocations and the price of
each non-traded intermediate good producer in each country solve its pro¯t maximizing problem;
(iii) taking the wage and all prices but its own as given, the allocations and the price of each
traded intermediate good producer in each country solve its pro¯t maximizing problem; and (iv)
the world market for bonds and the domestic markets for labor clear.
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
To facilitate analysis of optimal monetary policy, we ¯rst examine a useful benchmark in which
price adjustments are °exible, and then describe the equilibrium dynamics under sticky prices. We
call the allocations in the °exible-price equilibrium the \natural rate" allocations, and deviations
of the allocations in the sticky-price equilibrium from their natural rate levels the \gaps." In
analyzing the equilibrium dynamics, we focus on log-deviations of equilibrium variables from
their steady-state values (denoted by hatted variables).
3.1 The Balanced-Trade Steady State and the Current Account
We begin by describing a balanced-trade steady state, in which all shocks are shut o® (i.e.,
Ak = A¤
k = 1 for k 2 fN;Tg) and the net export is zero. The net export in the home country is
given by
NXt = ¹ PHtC¤
Ht ¡ Et ¹ P¤
FtCFt
= (1 ¡ !)®¤EtP¤
t C¤
t ¡ (1 ¡ !)®PtCt






















where the second equality follows from the demand functions for ¯nal traded consumption goods
as in (2.10) and its foreign counterpart, the third from the de¯nition of the real exchange rate,
and the last from the international risk-sharing condition (2.26). In the balanced-trade steady
15
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Clearly, if the countries have symmetric structures, that is, if ® = ®¤, then we have Á0 = 1 and,
from the risk-sharing condition (2.26), Ct = QtC¤
t . Since the real exchange rate Qt represents
the relative price of foreign consumption basket in terms of home consumption, it follows that,
under symmetric structures, international risk-sharing leads to equalized aggregation consumption
(measured in identical units) across countries for each period t. Yet, in the presence of structural
asymmetry, that is, in the more general case with ® 6= ®¤, we have Á0 6= 1 so that consumptions in
the two countries are not necessarily equal (in conformable units) even with households trading the
state-contingent assets in the international ¯nancial market. In this case, the Á0 term represents
a \risk-sharing wedge" that arises only in the presence of structural asymmetry in the global
economy. It turns out, as we show below, the condition under which the risk-sharing wedge arises
also leads to sizable welfare gains from international monetary policy coordination.7
Given that Á0 = ®=®¤, equation (3.1) implies that the net export is zero not only in the steady
state, but for all t ¸ 0. With zero net export, along with the assumption that neither country has
an initial outstanding debts, the equilibrium current account would be zero for all t. This result
greatly simpli¯es our analytical derivations of the welfare criteria.
3.2 The Terms of Trade and Some Aggregation Results
The balanced-trade steady-state conditions described above imply that the risk-sharing condition








This condition is quite useful in obtaining the aggregate results and the approximated welfare
objectives below.
We now derive some aggregate results to be used in obtaining the welfare objectives under
optimal policies. Let YTt = CHt + C¤
Ht denote aggregate demand for home-produced traded
intermediate goods. We call YTt the aggregate traded output. Similarly, let YNt = CNt denote
the aggregate non-traded output. Then we have




] = ®PtCt; (3.4)
7Pesenti and Tille (2004) emphasize the importance of the risk-sharing wedge in analyzing gains from interna-
tional monetary policy coordination in a one-sector open economy model with preset prices. The risk-sharing wedge
in our model is somewhat di®erent from theirs in that it is determined here by the balanced-trade steady-state
conditions, so that it is independent of monetary policy; whereas in the Pesenti-Tille world, the wedge is given by
the ratio of the expected marginal utility of consumption in the two countries, and is endogenous to policy. Such
di®erence stems mainly from the di®erent assumptions about the timing of portfolio choice decisions.
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in (2.8) and (2.10) and their foreign counterparts, and the second equality follows from the risk-






Let St = Et ¹ P¤
Ft= ¹ PHt denote the home country's terms of trade. It follows from (3.4) and (3.5),






Under Cobb-Douglas aggregation technologies, expenditure on non-traded goods is a constant
fraction of total consumption expenditures in each country. In particular, we have
¹ PNtYNt = (1 ¡ ®)PtCt; ¹ P¤
NtY ¤
Nt = (1 ¡ ®¤)P¤
t C¤
t : (3.7)
Equation (3.4) and the price index relations Pt = ¹ P®
Tt ¹ P1¡®
Nt and ¹ PTt = ¹ P!
Ht[Et ¹ P¤
Ft]1¡! imply




where QNt = ¹ PNt= ¹ PTt denotes the relative price of non-trade goods. Similarly, (3.7) implies that
the real demand for home non-traded goods is given by
YNt = (1 ¡ ®)CtQ¡®
Nt: (3.9)
Use (3.9) to eliminate QNt and (3.6) to eliminate St from (3.8), and go through the same procedure
for the foreign country, we obtain









Thus, aggregate consumption in each country is a weighted average of the non-traded output and
a composite of traded outputs produced in the two countries.
















0 (PN(j)= ¹ PN)¡µNdj measures the price-dispersion within the sector. Similarly, the







0 (PH(j)= ¹ PH)¡µTdj. Expressions for L¤
N and L¤
T can be obtained in a similar way
for the foreign country.
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When price adjustments are °exible, ¯rms' pricing decisions are synchronized, so that the optimal
price set by a ¯rm is a constant markup over its contemporaneous marginal cost and that the
price index in each sector coincides with the pricing decision of a typical ¯rm in that sector. We
now describe the °exible-price equilibrium allocations, that is, the natural rate allocations.
It is easy to show that the natural-rate level of sectoral outputs, in log-deviation forms, are
given by
^ yn
Tt = ^ aTt; ^ yn
Nt = ^ aNt: (3.13)
Thus, under °exible prices, each sector's output responds one-for-one with the sector-speci¯c
shocks, and there is no inter-sectoral or international spillover e®ects of shocks on production. It
then follows from (3.12) and (3.11) that the natural rates of sectoral employment are constant,
that is, ^ ln
Tt = ^ ln
Nt = 0.
Next, given the solution for the natural rate of traded output as described in (3.13) and its
foreign counterpart, the relation (3.6) implies that the natural rate of the terms of trade is given
by
^ sn
t = ^ aTt ¡ ^ a¤
Tt; (3.14)
Thus, an increase in the relative productivity in home's traded sector (relative to the foreign
traded sector) tends to lower the relative price of traded goods produced in the home country,
and thus leads to worsened terms of trade for that country.
Third, given the solutions for the sectoral outputs and the terms of trade above, we can solve
for the natural-rate level of aggregate consumption using (3.10), and the solution is given by
^ cn
t = ®^ aTt + (1 ¡ ®)^ aNt ¡ ®(1 ¡ !)^ sn
t : (3.15)
Thus, aggregate consumption responds not only to domestic sectoral shocks, but also to move-
ments in the terms of trade since part of the consumption basket consists of imported goods.
An improved domestic productivity or terms of trade would raise the natural rate level of con-
sumption. It follows from the intertemporal Euler equation (2.5) that the real interest rate in the
°exible-price equilibrium is given by
^ rrn
t = Et¢^ cn
t+1 = 0; (3.16)
where we have used the solution for ^ cn
t in (3.15) and the random-walk properties of the shock
processes. The solutions for foreign consumption and real interest rate are similar.
Finally, the relative price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods in the °exible-price
equilibrium can be obtained by using the pricing decision equations and the solution for the terms
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^ qn
Nt ´ ^ ¹ pNt ¡ ^ ¹ pTt = ^ aTt ¡ ^ aNt ¡ (1 ¡ !)^ sn
t : (3.17)
Hence, in the °exible-price equilibrium, the relative price of non-traded goods decreases with the
relative productivity of the non-traded sector. Further, an improvement in the terms of trade
(i.e., a fall in ^ sn
t ) would make imported goods relatively cheaper, so that the price of the traded
basket would fall and the relative price of non-traded goods would rise.
3.4 The Sticky-Price Equilibrium
The sticky price equilibrium is characterized by the optimizing conditions derived in Section 2.
Denote ~ xt = ^ xt ¡ ^ xn
t the deviation of equilibrium variable ^ xt under sticky prices from its own
natural rate ^ xn
t , that is, the gap. After log-linearizing, the private sector's optimizing conditions
in the home country can be summarized below:
¼Nt = ¯Et¼N;t+1 + ·N~ yNt; (3.18)
¼Ht = ¯Et¼H;t+1 + ·T ~ yTt (3.19)
¢~ yNt = ¢~ yTt ¡ ¼Nt + ¼Ht ¡ ¢^ aNt + ¢^ aTt; (3.20)
®~ yTt + (1 ¡ ®)~ yNt = Et[®~ yT;t+1 + (1 ¡ ®)~ yN;t+1] ¡
f^ rt ¡ Et [®¼H;t+1 + (1 ¡ ®)¼N;t+1]g; (3.21)
(3.22)
where the ¼'s denote the sectoral in°ation rates, the ~ y's denote the sectoral output gaps, and
·i =
(1¡¯°i)(1¡°i)
°i is a constant that measures the responsiveness of the pricing decisions to
variations in the real marginal cost gap in sector i 2 fN;Tg. The foreign optimizing conditions
are analogous.
Equations (3.18) and (3.19) describe the Phillips-curve relations in the two sectors. These
relations are forward-looking in that a sector's period-t in°ation rate depends solely upon current
and expected future marginal cost gaps, which coincide here with the output gaps, in that sector.
Equation (3.20) describes the relation between changes in the expenditures on the two sectors'
outputs. Given the Cobb-Douglas aggregation technologies, these expenditures are proportional to
each other, as re°ected in (3.20). Equation (3.21) is derived from log-linearizing the intertemporal
Euler equation (2.5) for the home household, with the consumption gap replaced by the output
gaps using the constant-expenditure-share relations. Note that the terms-of-trade gap cancels out
as we replace the consumption gap by the output gaps and the consumer price in°ation rate by
the sectoral in°ation rates.
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output gaps here) and the consumption gap, the terms-of-trade gap, and the relative-price gap.
For this purpose, we use (3.8) and (3.9) to obtain
~ yTt = ~ ct + (1 ¡ ®)~ qNt + (1 ¡ !)~ st; (3.23)
~ yNt = ~ ct ¡ ®~ qNt: (3.24)
The marginal cost gap in each sector depends positively on the consumption gap but negatively
on the sector's relative price gap. Additionally, the marginal cost in the home country's traded
sector depends positively on its terms-of-trade gap, so that a terms-of-trade improvement (i.e., a
fall in ~ st) leads to a fall in the real marginal cost in the home traded sector, but has no direct
e®ect on the marginal cost in the non-traded sector.
Before we proceed to characterize optimal monetary policy, it is necessary to ¯nd out whether
or not, in a two-sector model like this, the national monetary authority faces a policy trade-
o® in stabilizing the output gaps and in°ation rates. In the absence of such trade-o®, optimal
independent monetary policy would be able to replicate the e±cient °exible-price allocations and
there would be no need for cooperation. Woodford (2003, Chapter 3) shows that, in a closed
economy with two sectors, if the degree of price stickiness is identical across sectors, then the
sectoral Phillips curve relations can be reduced to an aggregate Phillips-curve that is identical to
that in a one-sector model, so that the trade-o® between price stability and stabilizing output
gap °uctuations disappears, regardless of whether or not the sectoral shocks are correlated.
Is this still the case in our two-sector open economy environment? To answer this question,
consider the special case with ·N = ·T = · so that the two sectors have identical durations of
price contracts. De¯ne a domestic in°ation index as ^ ¼Dt = ®^ ¼Ht + (1 ¡ ®)^ ¼Nt. Then, by taking
a weighted average of the sectoral Phillips curves in (3.18) and (3.19), and use (3.23) and (3.24)
to replace the output gaps, we obtain
¼Dt = ¯Et¼D;t+1 + ·~ ct + ·®(1 ¡ !)~ st: (3.25)
In the special case of a closed-economy (with ! = 1), this relation reduces to an aggregate Phillips
curve that implies no trade-o® between output stability and price stability: the national central
bank is able to close the output gap by simply setting the domestic in°ation index ¼Dt = 0. In an
open economy as the one presented here, however, °uctuations in the terms-of-trade gap act as
an endogenous \cost-push shock" that introduces a trade-o® between stabilizing the output gap
and the domestic in°ation index, unless the traded sector is entirely shut o® (i.e., with ® = 0). It
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is not possible to implement the °exible-price allocations unless the domestic sectoral shocks are
perfectly correlated.
Proof: By contradiction. Suppose that the °exible-price allocations could be replicated. Then
the output gaps would both be closed, that is, ~ yTt = ~ yNt = 0 for all t. It follows from (3.18) and
(3.19) that ¼Nt = ¼Ht = 0 for all t. But then, given that the output gaps are all closed, (3.20)
implies that ¢^ aTt ¡ ¢^ aNt = ¼Nt ¡ ¼Ht, contradicting ¼Nt = ¼Ht = 0 unless ¢^ aTt = ¢^ aNt for all
t.
Q.E.D.
Although the °exible-price equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal, the existence of the
trade-o® between stabilizing the gaps and in°ation rates stated in Proposition 1 renders optimal
monetary policy second best. In the next section, we de¯ne the optimal monetary policy problems
and characterize allocations under cooperative and non-cooperative policies.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
Optimal monetary policy entails maximizing a social objective function subject to the private
sector's optimizing conditions. A natural welfare criterion in our model is the representative
households' expected life-time utility. Following the approach described in Benigno and Woodford
(2004), we derive an analytical, quadratic expression for the welfare criterion based on second-
order approximations to the representative households' utility functions and to the private sectors'
optimizing conditions (except for those exact log-linear relations). We substitute all relevant
second-order relations into the objective function to obtain a quadratic expression for the welfare
objective. Finally, upon obtaining this objective, we solve for the allocations under optimal mon-
etary policy by maximizing the quadratic objective subject to the set of log-linearized equilibrium
conditions (3.18)-(3.21) and their foreign counterparts. In this ¯nal step, we are essentially solv-
ing a linear-quadratic (LQ) problem with rational expectations. The LQ approach has become a
popular tool in studying optimal monetary policy in closed economy models with a single sector
(e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)) or multiple sectors (e.g., Erceg, et al. (2000), Huang and
Liu (2004b)), and in open economy models with a single traded sector (e.g., Clarida, et al. (2002),
Benigno and Benigno (2003), Gali and Monacelli (2002), and Pappa (2004)). We are the ¯rst to
derive an analytical expression for the welfare objective in an open economy model with multiple
21
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 514
August 2005sectors and multiple sources of nominal rigidity, for both a regime with independent central banks
(i.e., the Nash regime) and one with cooperating central banks (i.e., the cooperating regime).8
4.1 Independent Central Banks
A regime with independent central banks is one in which the national monetary authority in
each country seeks to maximize the welfare of its own households, subject to the private sector's
equilibrium conditions, taking foreign policy variables as given. We refer to this regime as the
\Nash regime" and a national central bank under this regime a \Nash central bank."
Before we proceed to describe optimal monetary policy under the Nash regime, it is important
to understand the nature of Nash policy. There are two layers of policy-making issues. The ¯rst
involves each national policy maker's optimal choice of steady-state subsidy rates, taking the
policy instruments (i.e., the subsidy rates) in the other country as given. The second involves
each national central bank's optimal choice of the monetary policy instrument (i.e., the nominal
interest rate) in the dynamic equilibrium, taking the monetary policy instrument in the other
country as given. A Nash equilibrium in such policy games is then the joint best responses.
Below, we ¯rst describe the problem facing each Nash policy maker who chooses domestic subsidy
rates to maximize its own country's welfare, taking the foreign policy as given. We then derive
the welfare objective facing each Nash central bank through quadratic approximations to the
domestic representative household's utility. Finally, we discuss the optimal monetary problem in
the dynamic equilibrium.
4.1.1 Optimal Steady-State Subsidy under the Nash Regime
The optimal steady-state subsidy rates in a given country under the Nash regime maximize the
country's domestic welfare in the steady state equilibrium, taking as given the domestic resource
constraints and the other country's steady-state subsidy rates. Here, we focus on ¯nding the
optimal subsidy rates in the home country. The optimal subsidy rates in the foreign country can
be found analogously.
8Our approach di®ers slightly from that adopted in the open-economy papers mentioned here [e.g., Clarida, et
al. (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Gali and Monacelli (2002), and Pappa (2004)] in that we do not limit
ourselves from the outset to taking ¯rst-order approximations to the private sectors' optimizing conditions. An
alternative solution method is to take second-order approximations throughout the model and then to compute
approximate optimal policy rules through non-linear simulations of the second-order system [e.g., Pesenti and Tille
(2004), Sutherland (2002b), Tille (2002), Tscharov (2004)]. A main advantage of our approach, and the standard
LQ approach described by Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2004) as well, is that it allows us to obtain
an analytical and explicit description of the objective function for optimal policy.
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AN = AT = 1, GH = GN = 1, and Lj = Yj for j 2 fN;Tg. The home central bank chooses its
(¿T;¿N) to maximize U(C)¡V (L) subject to the resource constraint (3.10) and the labor market
clearing condition L = LN + LT. In the steady-state equilibrium, Lj = Yj so that the resource




In choosing (¿T;¿N), the home policy maker takes the foreign subsidy rates (¿¤
T;¿¤
N) as given.
Since the foreign traded output Y ¤
T is solely determined by foreign subsidy policy, the home policy
maker takes Y ¤
T as given. To see how Y ¤
T is determined by foreign subsidy policy, we use the foreign














where the second equality follows from the foreign household's labor supply decision and the
constant-expenditure-share condition (3.5) for traded goods. Evidently, Y ¤
T is a function of ¿¤
T
and structural parameters. Thus, as the home policy maker takes (¿¤
T;¿¤
N) as given, it also takes
Y ¤
T as given.
The ¯rst order conditions for the steady-state optimal policy problem imply that
(1 ¡ ®)U0(C)C = V 0(L)LN; ®!U0(C)C = V 0(L)LT: (4.2)
With our utility function U(C)¡V (L) = log(C)¡ªL, these ¯rst-order conditions yields a solution
for the steady-state labor allocations:
ªLN = 1 ¡ ®; ªLT = ®!; ;ªL = 1 ¡ ® + ®!: (4.3)
To ¯nd the subsidy rates that are consistent with the optimal steady state allocations under the
Nash regime, we use the pricing equations to get














where the second equality follows from the labor supply equation and equation (3.4), the third
from YT = LT in the steady state, and the last from the steady-state relation (4.2). Similarly, the
optimal subsidy rate in the non-traded sector is given by











The home policy maker under the Nash regime chooses a subsidy rate for the non-traded
sector that exactly o®sets the steady-state markup distortion in that sector, and it chooses a
subsidy rate for the traded sector that lowers the e®ective markup distortion, but not all the
way to neutralize it. The Nash policy maker would like to lower the markup distortion in the
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home household's welfare; it does not want to completely neutralize the markup distortion in that
sector because it is not concerned about the e®ects of domestic production of traded output on the
foreign household. By maintaining some monopoly power in the traded sector, the Nash policy
maker allows the traded-goods producers to maintain lower production and charge higher export
prices, so as to improve home's terms of trade. Meanwhile, the foreign policy maker takes home
subsidy rates as given, and chooses its own subsidy rates in a similar fashion. In consequence,
under the Nash subsidy policy, equilibrium allocations are e±cient for each individual country, but
socially suboptimal from a world-wide view, as Nash policy makers overlook the terms-of-trade
externality.
4.1.2 The Welfare Objective for the Nash Central Bank
We characterize the welfare objective for each Nash central bank by taking second-order ap-
proximations to its domestic representative household's period utility function. Again, we focus
on the home country, and note that the foreign country's problem is similar. A second order
approximation to the home household's period utility function yields














where Uss denotes the steady-state period utility, a hatted variable denotes log-deviations of the





represents terms that are
of third or higher order in an appropriate bound on the amplitude of the shocks.


















where the term t:i:p: denotes terms independent of policy and the period loss function is given by
LNash
t = (1 ¡ ®)(~ y2
Nt + µN·¡1
N ¼2




Under the Nash regime, the home central bank solves its optimal monetary policy problem by
maximizing the quadratic welfare objective function (4.7) subject to the domestic private sector's
optimizing conditions (3.18)- (3.21). The foreign central bank's welfare objective and optimal
policy problem are analogous.
The welfare criterion described in (4.7) and (4.8) reveals that a Nash central bank's optimal
monetary policy is inward-looking. Speci¯cally, it seeks to minimize the variations in its domestic
marginal cost gaps (or output gaps) and in°ation rates, so as to bring the equilibrium allocation
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domestic marginal cost gaps and in°ation rates, so that it cannot implement the °exible-price
allocations (Proposition 1), unless the size of one sector approaches zero (i.e., ® = 1 or ® = 0), or
there is only one source of nominal rigidity (i.e., °T = 0 or °N = 0), or the shocks are perfectly
correlated (i.e., ¢^ aTt = ¢^ aNt).
In general, allocations under optimal independent monetary policy are second best, and the
social welfare under such policy depends on the relative weights in front of each of the four
variables that the central bank cares about. The weights assigned to non-traded in°ation and
output gap are proportional to the sector's size (1¡®), while the weights assigned to traded sector
in°ation and output gap depend on both the sector's size (®) and the degree of steady-state home
bias (!). Since ! < 1 in an open economy like this, the weights assigned to the traded-sector
variables are less than the sector's size. Thus, the Nash central bank not only tries to exploit the
terms-of-trade externality by choosing a lower subsidy rate than necessary to o®set the markup
distortions in the traded sector, it also cares less about the variabilities of in°ation and output
gap in that sector. Finally, when the size of each sector is held constant, the weight assigned to
a sector's in°ation rate increases with the elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated goods
produced in that sector (i.e., increases with µj) and with the sector's price-rigidity (i.e., decreases
with ·j). Yet, a sector with more rigid prices needs not receive a larger weight for its in°ation in
the loss function, since the weight here is scaled by the relative size of the sector.
To gain further insight of the welfare objective, we use the relations (3.24) and (3.23) to replace
the output gaps in the loss function, and we show in the Appendix that the loss function can be
rewritten as
LNash
t = ~ c2
t + ®(1 ¡ ®)~ q2
Nt + ®!(1 ¡ !)~ s2




Ht + t:i:p:: (4.9)
Thus, in addition to variations in the in°ation rates and consumption gap, the Nash central bank
cares about variations in both the domestic relative price gap and the international relative price
gap (i.e., the terms-of-trade gap). The domestic relative price gap receives a weight that is concave
in the parameter ® that measures the relative size of the traded sector, and the weight reaches its
maximum when ® = 0:5. When the size distribution of sectors is skewed, however, the sector with
a greater share receives a larger weight in front of its sectoral in°ation rate, and °uctuations in
the relative-price gap become less of a concern for optimal policy. The terms-of-trade gap receives
a weight that is proportional to ® and is concave in !. In the extreme case with no trade (i.e.,
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Under the Nash regime, optimal monetary policy for the home central bank is obtained by maxi-
mizing its welfare objective (4.7), subject to the private sector's optimizing conditions summarized
by (3.18)-(3.21) and their foreign counterparts, taking the foreign monetary policy instruments
as given. Similar for the foreign central bank. A Nash equilibrium is the joint \best responses"
in the space of policy instruments.
Assume that a country's monetary policy instrument is its nominal interest rate. Evidently,
given the home nominal interest rate rt, all variables in the home central bank's loss function
(4.8), that is, the sectoral output gaps and in°ation rates, can be solved uniquely from the four
equations in (3.18)-(3.21). Similarly, given the foreign nominal interest rate r¤
t, the four variables
that the foreign central bank cares about in its loss function can be solved uniquely from the
corresponding foreign private sector's optimizing conditions. In other words, taking r¤
t as given is
equivalent to taking foreign private sector's optimizing conditions, and therefore, foreign sectoral
output gaps and in°ation rates, as given. With no spill-over e®ects of foreign monetary policy on
the variables that the home central bank cares about in its loss function (i.e., the sectoral output
gaps and in°ation rates), the home central bank seeks to maximize its own welfare objective (4.7)
subject to the four domestic optimizing conditions (3.18)-(3.21). Similar for the foreign central
bank. In this sense, optimal monetary policy under the Nash regime is inward-looking.9
An important issue of concern, in the spirit of Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002), is then: From a
global perspective, would the lack of international monetary policy coordination incur substantive
welfare losses? Obstfeld and Rogo® ¯nd that the answer is perhaps \no" in their model with a
single source of nominal rigidity. We revisit this issue below in a context with multiple sources
of nominal rigidities and with potential structural di®erences across countries in the form of
asymmetric sizes of traded sectors. For this purpose, we ¯rst derive a welfare objective function
for the policymakers under the cooperating regime in the next subsection, and then examine the
quantitative welfare gains from coordination in Section 5.
4.2 Cooperating Central Banks
A regime with cooperating central banks is one in which monetary policy decisions are delegated
to a supranational monetary institution (i.e., a social planner), who seeks to maximize a weighted
average of national welfare in the two countries, subject to the private sectors' optimizing condi-
tions in both countries. Unlike a Nash central bank, the planner here does not take any country's
9Of course, foreign monetary policy may a®ect the price level and consumption in the home country through
the terms of trade. But these variables do not independently enter the home central bank's loss function.
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assigns equal weights (half) to each member country's national welfare.
4.2.1 Optimal Steady-State Subsidy under Cooperation
Under the cooperating regime, the social planner chooses the steady-state subsidy rates in the two
countries to maximize the countries' collective welfare 1
2[U(C) ¡ V (L) + U(C¤) ¡ V (L¤), subject
to the national resource constraints (3.10) and the labor market clearing conditions LT +LN = L
and L¤
T + L¤
N = L¤, with Yj = Lj and Y ¤
j = L¤
j imposed. Under our parameterized period utility
functions, the ¯rst order conditions for the planner's steady-state problem lead to
ªLN = 1 ¡ ®; ªLT = ®! + ®¤(1 ¡ !); (4.10)
ªL¤
N = 1 ¡ ®¤; ªL¤
T = ®¤! + ®(1 ¡ !): (4.11)
The optimal subsidy rates under cooperation are then given by
1 + ¿T =
¹T
®





®¤ [®¤! + ®(1 ¡ !)]; 1 + ¿¤
N = ¹¤
N: (4.13)
Evidently, in the case with symmetric structures, that is, with ® = ®¤, the optimal subsidy
rates in the traded sectors exactly o®set the steady-state markup distortions, as do the subsidies
in the non-traded sectors, so that the steady-state equilibrium allocations under the cooperating
regime coincide with those under perfect competition and are thus Pareto optimal. However, with
structural asymmetry, the optimal subsidy rates in the traded sector do not o®set the monopolistic
markups, although the resulting steady-state allocations are still socially e±cient since they solve
the social planner's steady-state problem.
To gain some intuition about the planner's optimal subsidy schedule in the presence of struc-
tural asymmetry, we assume, without loss of generality, that ® > ®¤. Thus, the optimal subsidy
rates are such that 1 + ¿T < ¹T and 1 + ¿¤
T > ¹¤
T. Evidently, the planner's optimal subsidy
schedule entails redistributing some monopoly markup power from traded-sector ¯rms in the for-
eign country to those in the home country, so as to maintain higher prices of home traded goods
relative to foreign traded goods than under symmetric structures. In other words, with structural
asymmetry, the planner tries to create an e±cient terms-of-trade bias in favor of the country that
has a larger traded sector.
Why? With ® > ®¤, a larger share of consumption expenditure goes to traded consumption
in the home country than that in the foreign country. Since the expenditure share of imported
goods in the traded consumption basket is constant and equal across countries, the home household
27
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 514
August 2005needs to import more traded goods than does the foreign household. Yet, since the trade balance
is zero in the steady-state equilibrium, the only way to enable the home household to a®ord
more imported goods is to lower the relative price of foreign traded goods, that is, to adjust the
terms-of-trade in favor of the home country.
Below, as we derive the welfare objective for the planner, we show that optimal monetary
policy under cooperation dictates the planner to balance the desire to set the terms of trade in
favor of the country that has a larger traded sector against its need to smooth °uctuations in the
terms-of-trade gap.
4.2.2 The Welfare Objective for the Planner under Cooperation
Although the optimal steady-state allocations under the cooperating regime di®er from that under
the Nash regime, the natural rate allocations in our model are independent of policy regimes, as
we have described in Section 3.3. The gaps in the welfare objective functions are thus deviations
of the allocations under each policy regime from the same natural rate allocations.









where Ut = logCt ¡ªLt and U¤
t = logC¤
t ¡ªL¤
t are the representative households' period-utility
functions. In the appendix, we derive the planner's welfare objective based on second-order
approximations to the households' utility functions and to equilibrium conditions. The resulting





















where the period loss function is given by
LPlanner
t = (1 ¡ ®)(~ y2
Nt + µN·¡1
N ¼2













with ~ ® = ®! + ®¤(1 ¡ !) and ~ ®¤ = ®¤! + ®(1 ¡ !).
In the special case with symmetric structures (i.e, with ® = ®¤), we have ~ ® = ~ ®¤ = ®. Thus,
the weights to the in°ation rates and output gaps in each sector are identical across countries.
In this case, as we show above, the planner chooses subsidy rates to fully o®set all markup
distortions and the °exible-price equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal. In other words, the
planner internalizes the terms-of-trade externality that the independent central banks tend to
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fully o®set the markup distortions in the traded sectors. In particular, as we show above, the
planner follows a policy that creates a terms-of-trade bias in favor of the country that has a larger
traded sector. It is important to emphasize that the terms-of-trade bias here is di®erent from the
terms-of-trade externality that Nash central banks try to exploit: the planner tries to internalize
the latter regardless of whether or not the two countries have symmetric structures; but in the
case with asymmetry, the planner adjusts the terms of trade in favor of the country that has a
larger traded sector.
Under the planner's optimal policy, the terms-of-trade bias needs to be balanced against the
stabilization goal implicit in the loss function (4.16). To see the dependence of the loss function
on variations in the terms-of-trade gap, among other variables, we use (3.23) and (3.24) and their
foreign counterparts to replace the output gaps and show in the Appendix that the loss function
can be rewritten as
LPlanner
t = (1 ¡ ®)µN·¡1
N ¼2
Nt + [®! + ®¤(1 ¡ !)]µT·¡1
T ¼2
Ht + ~ c2





Nt + [®¤! + ®(1 ¡ !)]µ¤
T·¤¡1
T ¼¤2
Ft + ~ c¤2
t + ®¤(1 ¡ ®¤)~ q¤2
Nt
+(® + ®¤)!(1 ¡ !)~ s2
t: (4.17)
Evidently, the planner would like to stabilize °uctuations in the terms-of-trade gap, and such
incentive increases with aggregate size of the traded sector in the two countries (i.e., with ®+®¤).
Clearly, the planner's loss function (4.17) is not a simple sum of the Nash central banks' loss
functions given by (4.9) and its foreign counterpart. The planner assigns larger weights than
do the Nash central banks on the traded-sector in°ation rates so as to internalize the terms-
of-trade externality that the latter try to exploit. This is a well-known source of welfare gains
from international monetary policy coordination under symmetric structures. With asymmetric
structures (say, ® > ®¤) and with home bias (i.e., ! > 0:5), the planner assigns a larger weight on
traded in°ation in the country with a larger traded sector (since ® > ®¤ and ! > 0:5 imply that
~ ® > ~ ®¤). Thus, not only does the planner try to favor the country with a larger traded sector
through creating the terms-of-trade bias, it also cares more about °uctuations in the traded
in°ation in that country.
Optimal monetary policy under cooperating central banks is obtained by maximizing the
welfare objective (4.15) subject to the private sector's optimizing conditions summarized in (3.18)-
(3.21) and their foreign counterparts.
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The analysis above reveals that there are potential gains from coordination, since an independent
central bank does not take into account the e®ects of terms-of-trade movements on its trading
partner, while the world planner tries to internalize this terms-of-trade externality when conduct-
ing optimal monetary policy. In this section we quantify the welfare gains from coordination and
relate the gains to the degree of asymmetry in production and trading structures across countries.
We also study the sensitivity of the results to the values of some key parameters in the model.
5.1 Parameter Calibration
Since it is di±cult to obtain closed-form solutions under optimal monetary policy, we resort to
numerical simulations to calculate the welfare outcomes of di®erent policy regimes. For this
purpose, we use calibrated parameter values summarized in Table 1.
Since the time frequency in our model is quarterly, we set ¯ = 0:99, so that the steady-state
annualized real interest rate is 4 percent. We set ! = 0:7 to capture steady-state home bias in the
traded consumption baskets. Since the steady-state share of imports in the home country's GDP
is given by ®(1 ¡ !), if we consider a traded-sector share of ® = ®¤ = 0:3 as a benchmark value,
then ! = 0:7 implies that the steady-state share of imports in GDP is 0:09, roughly corresponding
to the sample average of the import share in the U.S. in its trade with the European Union. We
set µT = µN = 10, so that the steady state markup is 11 percent; and °T = °N = 0:75, so that
the Calvo pricing contracts in each sector last for four quarters on average. We set the standard
deviation of the innovations to sectoral productivity shocks to 0:01. In our baseline experiment,
we assume that the shocks are uncorrelated across sectors and across countries.
5.2 Symmetric structures
We ¯rst consider the special case with symmetric structures across countries, that is, with ® = ®¤.
In this case, the planner chooses subsidy rates to fully o®set the steady-state markup distortions in
all sectors and thus the natural-rate allocations under the cooperating regime are Pareto optimal.
Since there are two sources of nominal rigidities and domestic shocks are imperfectly correlated
in each country, neither independent central banks nor the planner can replicate the natural-
rate allocations. There are potential welfare gains from coordination since the planner tries to
internalize the terms-of-trade externality that the independent central banks tend to overlook.
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central banks (the solid line) and those under cooperation (the dashed line), where we assume the
two countries have symmetric structures. The welfare loss here is measured by the percentage of
steady-state consumption equivalence, that is, the percentage increase in steady-state consump-
tion required to keep the households indi®erent to move from a world with °exible prices to one
with sticky prices and optimal monetary policy. The gains from coordination are the di®erence
between the welfare losses under the Nash regime and those under the cooperating regime.
The ¯gure reveals that there are gains from coordination in our multi-sector model. However,
the quantitative size of the gains is small relative to the welfare losses stemming from ine±cient
°uctuations in domestic relative-price gaps under optimal policy. The magnitude of the welfare
losses under optimal policy and of the gains from coordination depends on the size of the traded
sector. In the extreme case with ® = 1, the non-traded sector is shut o® and the model reduces
to the standard, one-sector open economy model; in the other extreme with ® = 0, the traded
sector is shut o® and the countries in the model become closed-economies. In both these extremes,
ine±cient movements in domestic relative-price gaps become irrelevant and optimal independent
monetary policy can replicate the natural-rate allocations, leaving no scope for welfare gains from
coordination.
In the more general case with ® lying between 0 and 1, nominal rigidities in both the traded and
the non-traded sectors become relevant for optimal policy. With imperfectly correlated domestic
shocks, independent monetary policy cannot attain the natural-rate allocations (Proposition 1),
so that there are potential gains from coordination. The gains arise because the planner tries to
internalize the terms-of-trade externality that the Nash central banks overlook. As shown in the
¯gure, the gains from coordination are larger when ® takes less extreme values. The gain reaches
its peak at ® = 0:5, with a maximum gain of about 0:14% of consumption equivalence. When ®
moves away from 0:5, the gain quickly diminishes. With our baseline value of ® = 0:3, the welfare
gains from coordination is quite modest at about 0:086% of consumption equivalence.
Figure 2 also bears out the main result established in Proposition 1: optimal policy can
replicate the °exible-price equilibrium (so that the welfare loss is zero) only if one sector is shut
o® (i.e., ® = 0 or ® = 1) or the domestic shocks are perfectly correlated. In general, with
two sources of nominal rigidities within each country and imperfectly correlated domestic shocks,
optimal monetary policy faces a non-trivial trade-o®. Neither the Nash regime nor the cooperating
regime can bring the equilibrium allocations to the e±ciency frontier. Further, the welfare losses
display a hump shape with respect to ®: as ® rises from 0 to 1, the welfare loss initially rises,
reaching a peak at ® = 0:5, and declines thereafter.
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the country from foreign shocks. Thus, the hump-shaped relation between the welfare losses
and ® primarily re°ects the e®ectiveness of domestic relative-price adjustments in stabilizing
the consumption gaps and sectoral in°ation rates in face of domestic sector-speci¯c shocks. To
make this connection more transparent, it helps to inspect the period loss function (4.9) for an
independent central bank. In the loss function, sectoral in°ation rates receive weights proportional
to the relative sizes of the sectors, whereas the relative-price gap (i.e., the ~ qNt term) receives a
weight that is concave in ®, reaching its maximum when ® = 0:5. As ® moves away from 0:5, the
weight in front of the relative-price gap becomes smaller, so that the monetary authority cares
less about °uctuations in the relative-price gap, and it can rely more e®ectively on relative-price
adjustments to insulate the impacts of sector-speci¯c shocks on the consumption gap and the
sectoral in°ation rates. The further is ® from 0:5, the smaller the weight in front of the relative-
price gap becomes, the more e®ective the monetary authority can use relative-price adjustments
to insulate domestic sector-speci¯c shocks, and thus the lower the welfare losses become under
optimal policy. Conversely, the closer the value of ® is to 0:5, the greater the weight the relative-
price gap receives, the less the policymakers are willing to adjust the relative-price gap, leading
to higher welfare losses. A similar logic applies to explaining the hump shape in the welfare losses
under cooperation in the case with symmetric structures.
5.3 Asymmetric structures
When the countries' have asymmetric structures (i.e., ® 6= ®¤), there are welfare gains from coor-
dination not only because the planner tries to internalize the terms-of-trade externality overlooked
by independent central banks, but the planner's optimal policy also creates a terms-of-trade bias
that favors the country with a larger traded sector. Further, the terms-of-trade bias has to be
balanced against the need to stabilize the gaps, including the terms-of-trade gap. In this sense,
the presence of the terms-of-trade bias when the countries have asymmetric structures leads to a
new source of welfare gains from coordination. A natural question is then: How large are such
gains?
Figure 3 provides an answer. There, we plot the relative welfare losses under Nash central
banks relative to those under cooperating central banks in the (®;®¤) space. The relative losses
here measure the gains from coordination. The gains are small along the diagonal of the space with
® = ®¤, as we have just discussed for the case with symmetric structures in the previous subsection.
When we move away from the diagonal so that the di®erence between ® and ®¤ enlarges, the gains
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as a new source of gains from coordination. In particular, the ¯gure plots the welfare gains under
symmetric structures as a function of ® (the line with circles), and also the gains for di®erent
values of ®¤ in the range between 0 and 1, with an increment grid of 0:1 (the lines without circles).
The magnitude of the gains in general increases with the cross-country di®erence in structures
(i.e., di®erence in ® and ®¤). If we take ® = 0:3 as a benchmark value for the size of the home
traded sector, then the welfare gain rises from 0:086% to 0:139% and then to 0:221% of steady-
state consumption equivalence as the value of ®¤ increases from 0:3 (symmetric structures) to
0:5 and then to 0:7. The size of these coordination gains is comparable to that from eliminating
business cycle °uctuations, as calculated, for example, by Lucas (1987).
5.4 Sensitivity
5.4.1 Home bias
We have so far considered the welfare gains from coordination with a calibrated value of the
degree of steady-state home bias in traded consumption baskets. We have seen in Section 4.1.1
and 4.2.1 that the home-bias parameter ! is an important determinant of both the terms-of-trade
externality that independent central banks try to exploit and the terms-of-trade bias that the
planner tries to create in favor of the country that has a larger traded sector. Thus, home bias
has also implications on the gains from coordination.
To understand how home bias in traded consumption a®ects welfare under optimal policies,
we revisit the optimal subsidy rates to traded-goods production for both the Nash central bank,
as in equation (4.4), and the central planner, as in equations (4.12)-(4.13). As ! increases,
the optimal subsidy rates to traded-goods production become closer to the sector's steady-state
markup distortion; in the limit with ! = 1, there is no trade and the optimal subsidy rates exactly
o®set the markup distortions regardless of the structural di®erences between the countries. Thus,
with a larger value of !, the welfare losses should be smaller under both the Nash and the
cooperating regimes; when ! approaches 1, the loss under the Nash regime would approach zero,
so would the gains from coordination.
Figure 5 con¯rms this intuition. The ¯gure plots the welfare losses under the two alternative
regimes (the upper panel) and the welfare gains from coordination (the lower panel) for ! 2
[0:1;0:9], where we have ¯xed ® = 0:3 and ®¤ = 0:6 to capture the structural asymmetry between
the two countries (these values of the ®'s are also used in the rest of the sensitivity analysis). The
¯gure shows that, as the degree of home bias rises (i.e., as the countries rely less on imported
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regimes become smaller, but the welfare gains from coordination also decline.
5.4.2 Correlation of Shocks
In our baseline experiments, we have assumed that shocks are uncorrelated both across sectors and
across countries. In contrast, the NOEM literature frequently assumes that shocks are perfectly
correlated within each country but uncorrelated across countries. We now examine the sensitivity
of our results to correlations between the shocks.
Figure 6 displays the welfare gains from coordination as the correlations between sectoral
shocks vary in the interval [¡1;1]. Apparently, variations in cross-country correlations (i.e.,
½TT and ½NN) do not generate visible e®ects on the welfare gains. The gains are much more
sensitive to the correlations between domestic shocks (i.e., ½TN). As domestic shocks become
more correlated, the welfare gains become unambiguously smaller. In the extreme case with
perfectly correlated domestic shocks, optimal monetary policy under both the Nash regime and
the cooperating regime can replicate the °exible-price allocations, and thus there are no gains from
coordination, despite of the structural asymmetry across countries. In this sense, our results here
extend the ¯ndings by Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002) (for the case with perfectly correlated domestic
shocks) and by Canzoneri, et al. (2004) (for the case with imperfectly correlated domestic shocks)
to an environment that allows for structural asymmetry across countries.
5.4.3 Price stickiness
In our baseline analysis, we have assumed that ¯rms in di®erent sectors face an identical duration
of pricing contracts: they both last on average for 4 quarters. We now relax this assumption
by allowing the relative length of the pricing contracts to vary. We examine the implications of
varying the exogenous price-stickiness on the gains from coordination.
Figure 7 plots the welfare gains as the price-stickiness in one sector varies, holding the stickiness
in the other sector ¯xed at its calibrated value. In particular, the solid line denotes the gains from
coordination when °T varies in the interval [0:1;0:8], while ¯xing °N = 0:75; and the dashed line
represents the other case when °N varies while °T is ¯xed at 0:75. Evidently, holding one sector's
price rigidity ¯xed, the welfare gains increase with the rigidity in the other sector. An exception
seems to be that, when °T is ¯xed at 0:75, the gains initially increase with °N, and then decline
when °N exceeds °T = 0:75. In general, the gains are more sensitive to variations in traded price
rigidity than to non-traded price rigidity. This is so because the welfare gains stem mainly from
the terms-of-trade externality and the terms-of-trade bias, and higher nominal rigidity and the
resulting greater price-dispersions among ¯rms in the traded sector lead to disproportionately
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monetary policy coordination.
6 Conclusions
We have revisited the issue of gains from international monetary policy coordination in a frame-
work that generalizes the standard model in the NOEM literature by introducing both traded and
non-traded goods, and more importantly, by allowing for a structural asymmetry across countries
in the size of the traded sector. For this purpose, we obtain welfare measures through second-
order approximations to the households' utility functions and to the private sector's optimizing
conditions. The gains arise from two channels. The ¯rst channel is rather standard in the NOEM
literature and is independent of the structural asymmetry in the model: if acting independently,
a country's central bank tends to overlook the e®ect of terms-of-trade on the other country's
well-being; whereas when the countries cooperate, this terms-of-trade externality would be prop-
erly recognized and e®orts would be made to internalize it. The second channel is unique to our
model and works only through structural asymmetries across countries: the planner's optimal
policy under the cooperating regime creates a terms-of-trade bias that favors the country with a
larger traded sector; and this bias has to be balanced against the need to stabilize °uctuations in
the terms-of-trade gap, among other variables in the policy objective. Absent structural asym-
metry, the welfare gains from coordination are quantitatively small under calibrated parameters;
as the degree of asymmetry enlarges, so do the welfare gains in general. With plausible structural
asymmetries, there are sizable gains. Further, holding other things constant, the gains are larger
if the countries have a greater share of imported goods in their traded basket, if the domestic
shocks are less correlated, or if the duration of pricing contracts is longer.
The terms-of-trade bias identi¯ed in this paper should not be confused with the usual sense
of terms-of-trade externality described in the NOEM literature. In the case with symmetric
structures across countries, there is no terms-of-trade bias under cooperation and the welfare
gains arise solely from internalizing the terms-of-trade externality. Under plausible parameters,
such gains are quantitatively small. A stronger case for policy coordination can be made when
the countries involved have asymmetric production and trading structures.
In our analysis, we have focused on a particular form of cross-country asymmetries in produc-
tion and trading structures. To the extent that the structural asymmetry in our model captures
some of the di®erences between developed economies and developing ones, our work sheds some
light on the welfare consequences of international monetary policy coordination between coun-
tries at di®erent stages of development. Of course, there are other ways to capture cross-country
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national monetary policy analysis. For instance, countries at di®erent stages of development may
have di®erent trend components of traded-sector productivity, they may have di®erent abilities
to access international ¯nancial markets, or they may have di®erent forms of labor market fric-
tions. Modeling structural di®erences along these dimensions may have important implications
for understanding the consequences of international policy coordination. If future studies along
these lines ¯nd, as in our current paper, that the gains from coordination might increase with the
degree of asymmetry, it would also raise the issue of whether countries have incentive to enter
cooperative agreements: it is a non-trivial political-economy question as how to divide the gains
among the countries with asymmetric structures. We conjecture that future research along these
lines should be both fruitful and promising. The current paper represents a ¯rst step toward this
direction.
A Appendix
A.1 Deriving the Welfare Objective under the Nash Regime
We characterize the welfare objective for a Nash central bank by taking second-order approxima-
tions to the representative household's period utility function. A second order approximation to
the home household's period utility function is given by (4.6) and is rewritten here for convenience
of references:














The ¯rst component of the approximated utility function is deviations of consumption from steady
state, which are related to deviations of outputs through the aggregate resource constraint (3.10).
The relation is given by
^ ct = (1 ¡ ®)^ yNt + ®!^ yTt + ®(1 ¡ !)^ y¤
Tt: (A.1.1)
The second part of the approximated period utility involves second-order approximations to the
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August 2005where the ¯rst equality follows from the approximated labor market clearing condition (A.1.2),
with the steady-state ratios LN=L = 1 ¡ ® and LT=L = ®! imposed, and the second equality
follows from the labor demand equations (3.11) and (3.12).
Subtract (A.1.3) from (A.1.1), and recognizing that the home planner takes foreign output
^ y¤
Tt as given, we obtain
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where, in obtaining the second equality, we have used the de¯nition of the output gaps ~ yjt =
^ yjt ¡ ^ yn
jt with ^ yn
jt = ^ ajt being the natural rate output in sector j 2 fN;Tg, and the fact that the
price-dispersion terms ^ Gjt are of second order. The notation t:i:p represents terms independent
of policy, including steady-state terms, shocks, and foreign outputs.
Finally, following Woodford (2003), we can show that the price dispersion terms ^ GNt and ^ GHt
can be related to variabilities in the sectoral in°ation rates. In particular, we have
1 X
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where the period loss function is given by
LNash
t = (1 ¡ ®)(~ y2
Nt + µN·¡1
N ¼2




where ·j = °j=((1 ¡ ¯°j)(1 ¡ °j) for j 2 fN;Tg. These correspond to (4.7)-(4.8) in the text.
The foreign Nash central bank's objective can be similarly derived.
A.2 Deriving the Welfare Objective Under the Cooperating Regime
The welfare objective for the social planner under the cooperating regime is given by (4.14), which
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August 2005A second-order approximation to the home household's period utility function is given by
(4.6), the same as in the Nash case. The ^ ct term is also the same as in the Nash case, and is given
by (A.1.1).
The terms involving employment, however, is di®erent from the Nash case since the steady-
state allocations are di®erent. In particular, the approximated employment terms in the home
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where we have used the steady state conditions (4.10) and the labor demand functions (3.11)
and (3.12), and we have de¯ned a constant ~ ® = ®! + ®¤(1 ¡ !). Subtracting (A.2.1) from the
expression for consumption in (A.1.1), we obtain the approximated period utility for the home
country:
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where t:i:p: denotes terms independent of policy, including constant terms and shocks. Similarly,
the approximated period utility function for the foreign country can be obtained as follows:
U¤
t = ¡(1 ¡ ®¤) ^ G¤
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where ~ ®¤ = ®¤! + ®(1 ¡ !).





















where the period loss function is given by
LPlanner
t = (1 ¡ ®)(~ y2
Nt + µN·¡1
N ¼2

















Working Paper Series No. 514
August 2005A.3 Loss Function in Terms of Consumption, Relative Prices, and Terms of
Trade
We now derive the relation between the period loss functions under the two regimes and the
consumption gaps, relative price gaps, and the terms-of-trade gaps.
A.3.1 The Loss Function Under the Nash Regime
The period loss function under the Nash regime is described by (4.8). For convenience of reference,
we rewrite it here
LNash
t = (1 ¡ ®)(~ y2
Nt + µN·¡1
N ¼2




From (3.8) and (3.9), the output gaps can be expressed in terms of gaps of consumption, relative
prices, and the terms of trade according to the following relations:
~ yTt = ~ ct + (1 ¡ ®)~ qNt + (1 ¡ !)~ st; ~ yNt = ~ ct + ¡®~ qNt; (A.3.1)
where ~ ct, ~ qNt, and ~ st denote the gaps of consumption, the relative price of non-traded goods,
and the terms of trade. Meanwhile, from (), the terms-of-trade gap is related to the relative
traded-output gaps in the two countries according to
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t + 2®(1 ¡ !)[~ ct + (1 ¡ ®)~ qNt]~ st
¡(1 ¡ !)®(~ y¤
Tt + ~ st)2
= f(¼2
Nt;¼2
Ht) + ~ c2
t + ®(1 ¡ ®)~ q2
Nt + ®!(1 ¡ !)~ s2
t ¡ ®(1 ¡ !)~ y¤2
Tt; (A.3.3)
where the second equality follows from (A.3.1), the third from (A.3.2), and the ¯nal equality is
obtained by collecting terms. Under the Nash regime, the home central bank takes foreign output
gap as given, so that ~ y¤2
Tt in the loss function is a term independent of policy. Thus, the period
loss function for the independent central bank in the home country is given by
LNash




Ht + ~ c2
t + ®(1 ¡ ®)~ q2
Nt + ®!(1 ¡ !)~ s2
t + t:i:p:; (A.3.4)
where the term t:i:p: = ¡®(1¡!)~ y¤2
Tt is independent of home's monetary policy. This corresponds
to (4.9) in the text.
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where the term t:i:p:¤ = ¡®¤(1 ¡ !)~ y2
Tt is independent of foreign's monetary policy.
A.3.2 The Loss Function Under the Cooperating Regime
The period loss function for the social planner under the cooperating regime given by (4.16) can
be rewritten as
LPlanner
t = (1 ¡ ®)(~ y2
Nt + µN·¡1
N ¼2
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The ¯rst two lines in the last equality correspond to the sum of the national period losses under
the Nash regime, and the third line contains terms that are unique to the cooperating regime (but
are absent under the Nash regime). Using the national loss functions (A.3.4) and (A.3.5) under
the Nash regime, and recognizing the assumption that the social planner under the cooperating
regime cares about the variables in both countries, so that the terms t:i:p: = ¡®(1 ¡ !)~ y¤2
Tt and
t:i:p:¤ = ¡®¤(1 ¡ !)~ y2
Tt in (A.3.4) and (A.3.5) cannot be treated as terms independent of policy,
we obtain
LPlanner
t = (1 ¡ ®)µN·¡1
N ¼2
Nt + [®! + ®¤(1 ¡ !)]µT·¡1
T ¼2
Ht + ~ c2





Nt + [®¤! + ®(1 ¡ !)]µ¤
T·¤¡1
T ¼¤2
Ft + ~ c¤2
t + ®¤(1 ¡ ®¤)~ q¤2
Nt
+(® + ®¤)!(1 ¡ !)~ s2
t; (A.3.6)
which is (4.17) in the text.
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Preferences: U(C;L) = lnC ¡ ªL ¯ = 0:99 ª adjusted
Aggregation: C = ¹ ®C®
TC1¡®
N ® = 0:3
CT = ¹ !C!
HC1¡!









, µk = 10, k 2 fT;Ng
Contract duration: °T = 0:75, °N = 0:75
Productivity Shocks: ¾T = 0:01, ¾N = 0:01
½TN = 0, ½TT = 0, ½NN = 0
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Data source: the World Bank. 
 
 
Figure 1: --- Value-added shares and tradedness of services  
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Figure 2:|Welfare losses of alternative monetary policy regimes: symmetric structures.
46
ECB









































Figure 3:|Welfare gains from coordination: sizes of the traded sectors
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Figure 4:|Welfare gains from coordination: symmetric structures (circled line)
versus asymmetric structures (solid lines)
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Figure 5:|Welfare losses under alternative regimes and gains from coordination: home bias.
49
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 514




























Gains from coordination as r
TN varies
Gains from coordination as r
TT varies
Gains from coordination as r
NN varies
Figure 6:|Welfare gains from coordination: correlations of sectoral shocks.
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Figure 7:|Welfare gains from coordination: sectoral price stickiness.
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